Recalibrating CSDP-NATO relations: the real pivot.  Security Policy Brief No. 47, June 2013 by Coelmont, Joel. & de Langlois, Maurice
  1   
Recalibrating CSDP-NATO Relations:  
The Real Pivot  
Jo Coelmont & Maurice de Langlois 
In an age of major power shifts, which we 
know from history always to be particularly 
dangerous, different scenarios are possible; 
the only promising one is that of more and 
well-structured  international  cooperation. 
Yet, critical voices point at a drifting apart 
of longstanding allies. Recalibrating CSDP-
NATO  relations  has  become  more 
important than ever. 
Are  long-standing  allies  drifting  apart?  In  the 
US,  struggling  with  budget  deficits,  questions 
such  as  “Is  current  US  security  strategy  not 
stimulating free-riding by allies and friends?”, or 
“NATO:  what  is  in  it  for  us?  “,  and  even 
“Should  the  US  not  withdraw  from  NATO’s 
military command structure?”
1, are more than 
ever  coming  to  the  fore.  In  Europe  on  the 
other  hand,  even  if  some  worry  about  the 
effects of the “the US pivot to Asia”, many are 
still  looking  to  the  US  to  take  ultimate 
responsibility for crisis management operations. 
The  effect  of  the  post-Iraq/post-Afghanistan 
context  in  the  US  and  the  real  meaning  of 
 
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 
“leadership  from  behind”  are  not  that  well 
understood  in  Europe.  The  message  that  at 
times  it  will  be  up  to  Europeans  to  take 
responsibility  has  not  come  across. 
Consequently,  so  far  Europeans  have  not 
achieved  more  coherence  in  defence 
capabilities, let alone more integration – barely 
some limited cooperation and minimal savings. 
Persistent shortfalls in military capabilities are 
not being met, quite the contrary.  
 
All  of  this  signals  the  absence  of 
transatlantic  dialogue.  And  as  to  the 
institutional dialogue between NATO and the 
EU/CSDP,  it  is  difficult  to  label  that 
constructive  or  successful.  Yet,  there  is  one 
common  concern:  austerity.  Its  impact  on 
defence  on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic  can 
hardly be overestimated. Quoting Churchill – 
“Gentlemen, we have run out of money. Now 
we  must  think”  –  may  inspire  us  to  give 
serious  thought  to  a  renewed  transatlantic 
relationship,  in  particular  to  an  appropriate 
CSDP-NATO link.  
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Until  recently,  the  common  view  was  that 
putting this issue on the political agenda would 
be  counterproductive  –  and  rightly  so.  Many 
well-intended efforts in that sense have fallen 
victim  to  lethal  collateral  damage  due  to  the 
asymmetric  membership.  The  Turkey-Cyprus 
issue is of the utmost importance – and must 
therefore be dealt with at the highest political 
level and not be reduced to a secondary issue 
dealt  with  in  the  slipstream  of    revisiting 
arrangements  between  NATO  and  CSDP. 
Confusing  those  two  debates  effectively  is 
counterproductive.  Today,  after  more  than  a 
decade of hesitation, it is time to develop the 
CSDP-NATO relationship on a new basis. The 
objective  of  this  paper  is  to  present  some 
practical recommendations to that end, to be 
part  and  parcel  of  a  strong  transatlantic 
dialogue. To arrive at these recommendations, 
we will examine the new posture of the US and 
the EU, major changes in NATO and CSDP, 
and the way crisis management operations are 
conducted.    
 
THE  US:  REMARKABLE  CONTINUITY 
ENTAILING TREMENDOUS CHANGE  
After having been drawn into two World Wars 
and with the Cold War looming, the US was 
naturally  propelled  into  the  role  of  “leading 
nation”,  in  particular  within  the  transatlantic 
community. It took the lead for about half a 
century, by stationing troops abroad, providing 
for  reinforcements  and  strategic  transport 
whenever    required,  ensuring  overall  strategic 
balance  and,  indeed,  by  determining  the 
security strategy for the whole of the Alliance 
and its friends.  Since the end of the Cold War 
the  political  environment  has  changed 
drastically. And so has the US.  
 
However,  a  closer  look  at  the  American 
position  in  the  present  geopolitical  context 
reveals  that  its  grand  strategy  remains 
reasonably intact: defending its position in the 
world,  politically,  economically  and  militarily. 
But  there  is  a  shift  towards  a  new  area  of 
concern, the Asian and Pacific region: the so-
called “pivot”. Consequently, there is a shift in 
the  location  and  numbers  of  US  soldiers 
stationed  abroad,  but  that  shift  remains 
remarkably small.  
 
Furthermore,  for  the  first  time  since  the 
early  1990s,  the  US  defence  budget  will 
decrease  substantially  over  the  next  decade. 
But then again, since World War II there have 
been  several  ups  and  downs  in  the  DOD 
budget. This time however the impact on allies 
and friends may be quite different. Even if the 
US  maintains  its  leadership  in  NATO,  it 
expects from the Europeans a more balanced 
burden-sharing.  Free-riding  has  now,  more 
than  ever,  become  an  issue.  Many  experts 
agree that in the past the US was seen as the 
overall guarantor of security, allowing partners 
to  steadily  lower  their  defence  expenditure 
without having to fear direct or even indirect 
consequences. Now, it is clear that the US no 
longer sees Europe as a security consumer but 
as a security provider. In the context of crisis 
management  operations,  this  boils  down  to: 
“dear allies and friends, sometimes you will be 
on  your  own!”    To  conclude,  even  if  the 
current  US  security  strategy  is  more  a 
rebalancing of its efforts than a full pivot to 
Asia,  Europeans  are  under  gentle  pressure 
from Washington to recalibrate their defence 
effort. So, the ball is in the European camp, 
with  Washington  being  one  of  the  strongest 
supporters to develop an effective and efficient 
CSDP.  
 
THE EU: NO OPTION BUT BECOMING 
THE ACTOR OF ITS FUTURE  
For the Europeans and the EU as such, the 
general  picture  looks  quite  different.  During 
the a-typical period of the Cold War, from a 
European  perspective,  the  security  paradigm 
appeared remarkably self-evident.  
 
At  present,  that  certainty  has  all  but 
evaporated.  The  crisis  in  former  Yugoslavia 
was a wake-up call, demonstrating for all to see 
the  absence  of  a  European  security  strategy   3 
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and  of  any  structures  to  steer  a  crisis 
management operation of limited magnitude in 
Europe’s own backyard. Saint-Malo signalled to 
European countries that any ambition to alter 
this situation leaves them no other option than 
to rebuild their respective sovereignties at the 
level of the EU, as they already did for so many 
other  vital  “national”  policies.  Four  decades 
after  the  rejection  of  a  European  Defence 
Community, the taboo that rested on “defence” 
as part of the European construction was lifted.  
Saint-Malo  thus  symbolises  a  first  and  most 
remarkable paradigm shift.  
 
However,  in  practice  Saint-Malo  was  only 
about  gathering  some  military  capabilities  for 
potential  “peacekeeping  operations”,  while 
“agreeing to disagree” on strategy. For some it 
was  about  becoming  a  more  significant 
contributor  during  such  military  operations 
with  the  purpose  of  gaining  influence  on 
decision-making  in  Washington;  for  others  it 
was about the ability to launch autonomous EU 
operations. This ambiguity led many countries 
to  believe  that  listing  some  of  their  existing 
capabilities in an EU catalogue would do the 
job and that when push would come to shove, 
any  shortfalls  would  in  any  case  be  filled  by 
NATO  –  read  by  the  US.  That  implicit 
paradigm is on its way out.    
 
Experience  has  shown  that  –  if  there  is 
sufficient  political  will  –  European  countries 
are able to deploy and sustain quite impressive 
numbers  of  troops.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
operation in Libya once again highlighted that 
the  already  identified  strategic  capability 
shortfalls  (strategic  air  transport,  air-to-air 
refuelling,  ISR,  and  SEAD)  constitute  the 
limiting  factor  for  Europeans.  Moreover,  at 
present there is little appetite among Europeans 
to launch operations that could be long-lasting, 
with  many  boots  on  the  ground,  with 
potentially  many  casualties,  or  considerable 
collateral  damage.  The  “declared  ambition” 
remains  to  conduct  the  whole  spectrum  of 
Petersberg Tasks, up to peace enforcement, but 
with a strong preference for “quick in, quick 
out”  operations.  For  Europeans  traditionally 
focussed  almost  exclusively  on  maintaining 
tactical  military  capabilities,  their  defence 
planning  is  now  confronted  with  a  new 
paradigm.  The  question  now  is  whether  they 
are still in favour of conducting the high-end 
Petersberg  operations,  up  to  peace 
enforcement, or not.  In short, Europeans need 
to reach agreement on the role and usefulness 
of  the  military  instrument  within  the  overall 
toolbox of external action.   
 
One  of  the  EU’s  mantras  is  its  strong 
ambition  to  act  preventively.  “We  need  to 
develop  a  strategic  culture  that  fosters  early, 
rapid and when necessary, robust intervention. 
[…]  Preventive  engagement  can  avoid  more 
serious problems in the future”, states the 2003 
European  Security  Strategy.  However, 
operations in Libya and Mali have made clear 
that  setting  up  preventive  crisis  management 
operations,  let  alone  urgent  interventions, 
remains among the structural weaknesses of the 
Union.  Ad  hoc  solutions  have  shown  their 
limits and can no longer hide the need for a 
more structured approach, for the ability to call 
on  permanent  capabilities  for  planning  and 
conduct of crisis management operations, and 
for  stand-by  assets  to  implement  them.  That 
very sensitive paradigm shift is in the making.  
 
Finally, the paradigm that CFSP and CSDP 
are to be built exclusively through a bottom-up 
approach  with  no  need  for  any  top-down 
steering  is  running  out  of  steam.  With  the 
Lisbon  Treaty  the  European  External  Action 
Service  was  created  to  bridge  “the 
supranational” and “the intergovernmental” in 
security matters. It has started to develop sub-
strategies,  each  focused  on  a  specific  region, 
such  as  the  Sahel  or  the  Horn  of  Africa. 
However,  recent  events  prove  that  such  sub-
strategies,  valuable  though  they  are,  must  be 
anchored  in  a  much  broader  strategy,  which   4 
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moreover  needs  to  be  well  known  and 
supported  by  the  Heads  of  State  and 
Government.  On  defence  matters,  the  Lisbon 
Treaty produced all the instruments to provide 
effective  top  down  direction.  The    respective  
white  books  or  defence  plans  of  the  Member 
States , all established  in more or less splendid 
isolation, have produced so far an impressive list 
of redundant military capabilities at the EU level, 
which far outnumber the list of  shortfalls. All 
these  are  good  reasons  for  the  December 
European  Council  on  Defence  to  tackle  crisis 
management  and  the  corresponding  military 
capability requirements, and to provide effective 
top-down steering. If not a new paradigm, this is 
at least a major change in policy.  
 
CRISIS  MANAGEMENT:  SOMETHING 
QUITE DIFFERENT THESE DAYS  
In crisis management there is no such thing as 
soft or hard power. There are but instruments of 
soft  and  hard  power.  Recent  experience  has 
made it evident, once more, that real power lies 
in a holistic and tailored approach, and in the 
ability to mobilize all of the required means at 
the  right  moment.  The  weakest  link  is 
determining the final outcome. The military and 
civilian capabilities deployed are simply catalysts, 
and  even  then  if  and  only  if,  on  the  ground, 
within  local  communities  and  in  the  region, 
some  crucial  political  ingredients  are  present. 
For  durable  solutions  to  be  possible,  the 
economic dimension must be brought in as well. 
Primus  inter  pares  is  the  political  factor:  a  clear 
desired political end-state that fits into a longer-
term strategy. Such a holistic and well-tailored 
approach  is  no  longer  simply  a  desirable 
objective in crisis management, but a necessity.  
 
In this context the strategic headquarters for 
planning and conduct of operations acquires a 
totally different meaning. Such a strategic HQ is 
to integrate all factors. Its scope goes beyond the 
traditional  3D  approach;  in  the  light  of  the 
growing “economization” of security, economic 
policies  are  to  be  integrated  as  well  into  an 
overarching roadmap leading to the desired end-
state.    All  of  these  dimensions  must  be 
represented in the “civil-military strategic HQ, 
their respective competences and specificities 
acknowledged. The aim is to safeguard unity of 
direction  or  unity  of  command  in  each  and 
every  distinct  area,  while  at  the  same  time 
ensuring  overall  coherence.  This  calls  for 
permanent  structures,  which  is  indeed 
common  practice  at  the  national  level  in 
countries experienced in crisis management, as 
well  as  in  some  international  organisations. 
Only thus can a strategic HQ be structurally 
part of the overall holistic set-up.  
 
At the military level, the US has set up six 
permanent  regional  unified  combat 
commands.  Among  them  US  Europe 
Command (USEUCOM), which is in no way 
considered to be duplicating NATO’s strategic 
HQ,  SHAPE,  because  in  the  US  system, 
whenever  operations  are  conducted,  the 
principle  of  supporting  and  support  HQ  is 
applied  to  all  of  the  permanent  combat  or 
force HQs. In the EU however, the strategic 
military  HQ  is  still  in  the  making.  For  well-
known political reasons, progress has had to 
remain under the radar screen. The paradox is 
that the current organisation within the Union 
is  rendering  any  preventive  or  urgent  action 
impossible.  Moreover,  not  only  is  an  EU 
strategic  HQ  essential  in  a  command  and 
control  structure,  but  it  too  has  to  be 
complemented by appropriate force or combat 
HQs.  
 
The final observation on crisis management 
is  that  the  specificities  of  a  given  crisis  will 
determine  the  international  organisation,  the 
country, or the group of countries best placed 
to take the lead. All of this pleads in favour of 
recalibrating CSDP-NATO relations.  
 
NATO IS TRANSFORMED  
NATO remains the transatlantic forum to deal 
with  collective  defence  and  military 
interoperability,  but  also  to  conduct  military 
crisis  management  operations  when  North   5 
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American and European countries decide to join 
forces.  
NATO  is  an  excellent  forum  to  generate 
military  capacity  through  its  force  generation 
conferences  among  Allies  and  partners. 
Moreover,  it  has  access  to  some  irreplaceable 
capabilities,  in  particular  several  highly 
specialised  force  HQs,  co-financed  by  Allies. 
However,  NATO  lacks  the  various  civilian 
components  needed  for  a  comprehensive 
approach.  This  constitutes  a  kind  of  mirror 
image  to  EU  –  and  another  good  reason  to 
redefine arrangements between the two.  
 
To  a  large  extent  the  “Berlin  Plus” 
arrangement  still  defines  the  relationship 
between CSDP and NATO. But it has in effect 
never  been  applied  in  the  circumstances  for 
which it was designed, i.e. to provide support to 
the EU “when NATO as such is not involved”. 
Berlin  Plus  was  used  only  for  post-conflict 
management, transferring from a NATO to an 
EU operation, and never under time pressure. 
Supporting  urgent  or  even  preventive  EU 
operations would be quite a challenge.  
 
Berlin Plus has outlived itself.  At the time it 
was about “no Discrimination, no Duplication, 
no Decoupling”, creating, in political terms, the 
notion of hierarchy between NATO and CSDP.  
But this did not stop unproductive competition 
between  NATO  and  CSDP.  Today,  it  is  well-
known  that  for  political  reasons  Berlin  Plus 
cannot be used. It is time to turn a dysfunctional 
CSDP-NATO  relationship  into  a  constructive 
and future-oriented one.   
 
RECOMMENDATIONS:  
THREE  CS  UNDERPINNING  A  NEW 
CSDP- NATO RELATIONSHIP  
The  new  geopolitical  environment  creates 
valuable  opportunities.  The  US  is  ending  two 
wars  in  Central  Asia.  European  countries  are 
repatriating their military forces as well. The US 
is  rebalancing  it  posture.  In  the  EU  we  are 
embarked  on  a  process  of  Europeanising  all 
policies constituting our international relations. 
Part of that endeavour is bringing ever closer 
the  defence  policies  of  the  Member  States, 
forging  a  Common  Security  and  Defence 
Policy  leading  to  a  common  European 
defence.  Throughout  the  Atlantic  all  of  our 
nations have national obligations and military 
tasks  to  ensure  at  home,  but  will  be  called 
upon ever more to operate in an international 
context. All of us are faced with tight budgets. 
Defence matters, defence budgets as well, but 
so  does  the  justified  expectation  that  the 
defence  effort  achieves  maximum  efficiency 
and  effectiveness.  This  requires  standing 
arrangements,  allowing  for  prevention,  rapid 
action,  and  being  part  of  reconstruction 
whenever required. This implies   all partners 
to  assume  responsibility  and  show  solidarity. 
In that context, it is not advisable to suggest 
that  the  US  leave  the  military  structure  of 
NATO. It is advisable for the EU to be more 
present in the Alliance. A sense of urgency is 
justified  at  this  pivotal  moment.  Time  has 
come to create a new era in the NATO-CSDP 
relationship.  Recommendations  to  do  so  are 
offered in 3 distinct domains.  
 
Co-operation 
•  Establish  a  new  deal  on  security,  a 
transatlantic  Strategic  Security  Compact, 
codifying  a  broad  concept  of  security, 
analyzing  the  challenges  posed  by  a 
multipolar  world,  and  aspiring  to  joint 
strategy and coordinated action to offer the 
right  solutions.  This  compact  should  be 
part  and  parcel  of  the  EU-US  Strategic 
Partnership.   
  
•  Convene  regular  and  structured  bilateral 
EU and US meetings in the context of the 
transatlantic Strategic Security Compact to 
enhance  effectiveness  and  better  support 
today’s  “multi-bilateral”  scheme.  Analyse 
the  possibility  of  deepening  permanent 
liaison  arrangements,  not  only  through 
embassies  but  also  between  relevant   6 
 
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 
 
policy-making  and  executive  bodies,  e.g. 
between the EEAS and the National Security 
Council.   
 
•  This  bilateral  EU-US  partnership  should 
inspire the debate at the level of CSDP and 
NATO. 
Co-ownership 
•  Implement  new  structures  for  dialogue 
between  NATO  and  CSDP  based  on  full 
participation, on both sides, of all Nations 
and  Members  States.  Joint    meeting  at  all 
levels  of  both  organisations  should  be 
allowed to deal at all times with issues related 
to  all  on-going  or  potential  crisis 
management  operations,  in  whatever 
international context. 
 
•  Whenever  a  military  operation  is  launched 
by the EU or NATO, apply a supporting-
supported  approach  in  both  directions 
allowing for the transfer or dual use of both 
NATO’s and the EU’s collective assets and 
capabilities: the HQs, centres of excellence, 
training  facilities  etc.  In  this  context, 
establish  command  and  control 
arrangements for such transfer, in particular 
of a specific HQ from one organisation into 
the chain of command of the other when it 
has the lead in a given operation.  
 
•  Synergies  on  military  capabilities,  and  in 
particular on civil-military and even dual use 
capabilities, should be jointly explored. 
 
Capabilities  
•  Develop  for  the  EU  member  states  an 
appropriate  level  of  strategic  autonomy, 
allowing  in  specific  cases  to  prepare,  plan 
and  conduct  operations  without  being 
dependent  on  direct  support  from  US 
military capabilities.  
 
•  Implement  an  effective  decision-making 
process allowing emergency action by both 
NATO  and  the  EU,  underpinned  by 
arrangements  for  immediate  mutual 
support. Establish liaisons teams 
between  the  Strategic  HQs  of 
both  NATO  and  the  EU,  the 
latter to be further strengthened 
and thus to become permanent.  
 
•  Coordinate  the  defence  planning  of 
countries, ensuring on the one hand that 
EU  member  states  are  able  to  set  up 
operations for the whole spectrum of the 
Petersberg  Tasks  and  on  the  other  hand 
that  missions  commonly  agreed  upon  in 
NATO  are  adequately  supported  as  well. 
In  this  context  the  defence  planning  of 
European  member  states  will  focus  on 
identifying  and  reducing  existing 
redundancies at the EU level, solving the 
already  identified  shortfalls,  maximising 
“pooling  and  sharing”,  prioritising  future 
requirements,  and  favouring  multilateral 
solutions  while  ensuring  corresponding 
national budgetary margins to do so.  
 
•  For  EU  member  states,  in  the  spirit  of 
Permanent  Structured  Cooperation, 
develop  a  co-leadership  of  countries  that 
have  the  will  to  become  the  engine  of 
Europe in defence and security (capacities, 
operations, budget). 
 
•  Preserve current procedures and practices 
to  ensure  interoperability  between  the 
forces of members and partners of NATO 
and  the  EU.  The  Connected  Forces 
Initiative offers a promising way forward in 
this  regard.  Intensified  multinational 
education  and  training  is  key  to 
maintaining  capable,  knowledge-based 
militaries. 
 
“It is important to avoid doing ‘too 
little too late’”   7 
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EPILOGUE  
Must the dialogue between CSDP and NATO remain 
impossible,  for  “well-known  reasons”?  More  and 
more, the relevance of NATO is becoming an 
issue of pressing importance for Americans and 
Europeans  alike.  Should  they  connect  their 
respective forces, how, and at what cost? The 
relationship  between  the  EU  and  Turkey  is 
important as well, but of a different nature and 
magnitude, and will therefore not to be solved in 
the  slipstream  of  any  renewed  CSDP-NATO 
relationship. Continuing to link these issues will 
at  best  lead  to  a  standstill  in  the  relationship, 
which is a luxury that we can no longer afford. 
Within our transatlantic community we have a 
longstanding  tradition  of  confronting  highly 
sensitive issues and subsequently solving them. 
The same is true within the process of European 
integration.  Mutual  respect  for  autonomy  is 
another  tradition  to  keep.  Rearticulating  and 
deepening  CSDP-NATO  relations  is 
undoubtedly  a  good  step  to  transcend  the 
present blockage.  
 
Events  dear  boy,  events.  The  specificities  of  a 
given  crisis  always  determine  the  international 
organization, the country or group of countries 
best placed to take the lead in crisis management 
operations.  The  more  options  available,  the 
better. Some argue that NATO is no longer set 
to  launch  any  military  operation  of  some 
magnitude. Others argue that CSDP is finished. 
We believe that both these convictions about the 
future  are  reckless  and  wrong.  Circumstances 
will dictate. Credibility and cohesion will be of 
the essence, for CSDP as for NATO, which calls 
for mutual support, not for competition.  
 
Europe’s defence will be European or not. By nature 
a European defence policy has to be part of a 
comprehensive  foreign  policy  and  of  a  global 
European security strategy even, covering both 
the internal and external aspects of security. In 
this context CSDP and NATO are but subsets, 
although of the first importance. Not that long 
ago, European countries tried to forge European 
defence outside the structures of the EU by 
turning to the Western European Union. An 
experiment  not  to  be  repeated.  Setting  up  a 
kind  of  European  pillar  (or  caucus  for  that 
matter) in NATO surely is a useful technical 
instrument  for  the  purpose  of  internal 
coordination  within  the  Alliance.  But  by  no 
means  can  such  a  pillar  substitute  for  a 
comprehensive security and defence policy of 
the Union and its Member States.  Consistency 
and synchronisation of efforts will be of the 
essence.  
 
Military Capabilities. Military capabilities are 
of the essence. It is an illusion to hope that 
optimizing  the  institutional  relations  between 
CSDP  and  NATO  will  generate  additional 
capabilities.  The  added  value  lies  in  making 
better use of existing capabilities and expertise, 
creating  a  win-win  situation  through  a 
“supporting and supported” approach during 
crisis  management  operations.  Hence  the 
proposed 3 Cs and in particular the suggestion 
to replace the concept of “assured access to 
NATO’s  planning  capacities”  by  “assured 
transfer of NATO’s  assets and capabilities to 
the EU”, notably C2 structures to be inserted 
in  a  modular  way  into  overarching  C2 
structures of the EU. Vice versa the UE is to 
support  NATO  operations  by  providing 
specific  capabilities  and  instruments  it  has 
developed within the framework of CSDP and 
in other areas relevant to crisis management, 
including  support  and  expertise  that  can  be 
provided by the EU Commission.     
 
Too  daring  proposals  or  too  short-term?  T h e  
recommendations  put  forward  in  this  paper 
may at first glance look rather daring, but they 
are  but  a  continuation  and  enhancement  of 
both  CSDP  and  NATO  as  autonomous  but 
cooperative  projects.  The  profound 
modifications which both CSDP and NATO 
will undergo in the years and decades to come 
may  reveal  these  recommendations  to  be 
unsustainable in the long term, to be replaced   8 
 
 
by more profound adjustments. In the meantime 
though it is important to avoid doing “too little 
too late”.  
 
This  calls  for  a  strategic  reflection,  on  all 
sides. A message to be taken on board at the 
upcoming  European  Council  on  defence  in 
December  2013  and  at  the  NATO  summit  in 
2014. 
 
Brigadier  General  (Ret.)  Jo  Coelmont, 
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the  Royal  Higher  Institute  for  Defence, 
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